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X-WR-CALNAME:Reinhard Selten Institute
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://old.selten.institute
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Reinhard Selten Institute
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DTSTART:20190331T010000
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DTSTART:20191027T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20190618T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20190618T153000
DTSTAMP:20260908T034507
CREATED:20190502T081136Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190502T081259Z
UID:7092-1560866400-1560871800@old.selten.institute
SUMMARY:ECONtribute – Seminar: Christina Schneider (UCSD)
DESCRIPTION:The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts:\nIMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to stabilize crisis countries by providing additional liquidity\, particularly if the crisis country is economically or politically important to them. But they are constrained by domestic politics. Politicians aim to balance these countervailing pressures. They provide bailouts when their own economy is exposed to negative spillover effects and when the crisis country is important for geo-strategic\, military\, or political reasons. Domestic economic and political constraints\, on the other hand\, limit their ability to bail out other countries. We test our hypotheses using an original data set on bilateral bailouts by the G-7 countries to countries that experienced financial crises between 1970 and 2010. The findings of our statistical analysis support our theoretical argument and contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex structure of international cooperation during financial crises.
URL:https://old.selten.institute/event/econtribute-seminar-christina-schneider-ucsd/
LOCATION:Institut für Politikwissenschaft\, Gottfried-Keller-Str. 6\, Cologne\, 50931
CATEGORIES:UoC
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