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X-WR-CALNAME:Reinhard Selten Institute
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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Reinhard Selten Institute
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DTSTART:20190331T010000
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DTSTART:20191027T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20190730T101500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20190730T114500
DTSTAMP:20260908T034448
CREATED:20190617T093220Z
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UID:7421-1564481700-1564487100@old.selten.institute
SUMMARY:ECONtribute Seminar: Anja Schöttner (HU Berlin)
DESCRIPTION:Anja Schöttner: „Non-Competitive Wage-Setting as a Cause of Unfriendly and Inefficient Leadership“ (joint work with Robert Dur and Ola Kvaloy) \nAbstract: This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles in organizations depend on the prevailing wage-setting conditions for workers. In particular\, we examine a leader who can – in addition to the use of monetary incentives – motivate a worker by adopting leadership styles that differ in their non-monetary consequences for the worker’s well-being. Some leadership styles produce non-monetary benefits for workers (such as those involving the provision of praise to high-performing workers)\, other styles impose non-monetary costs (such as those involving social punishment for low performers). We show that leaders never use the latter type of leadership when the worker is hired in a competitive labor market. In contrast\, in labor markets with non-competitive wage-setting (e.g.\, in the presence of trade union bargaining or minimum wage legislation) leaders sometimes do use the `unfriendly’ style\, and the more so the worse the worker’s labor market prospects are. We show that this is socially inefficient. `Friendly’ leadership styles are always adopted when they are socially efficient.
URL:https://old.selten.institute/event/econtribute-seminar-anja-schoettner/
LOCATION:University of Bonn\, Juridicum\, Faculty Lounge\, Room 0.036\, Adenauerallee 24-42\, Bonn\, 53113\, Germany
CATEGORIES:UoB
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